The present study explored psychological predictors of response to a series of three 25 second inhalations of 20% carbon dioxide-enriched air in 60 nonclinical participants. Multiple regression analyses indicated that only anxiety sensitivity physical concerns predicted self-reported fear, whereas both physical anxiety sensitivity concerns and behavioural inhibition sensitivity independently predicted affective ratings of emotional arousal. In contrast, the psychological concerns anxiety sensitivity dimension predicted ratings of emotional displeasure (valence), and both psychological anxiety sensitivity concerns and behavioural inhibition sensitivity independently predicted (...) emotional dyscontrol. No variables significantly predicted heart rate. These data are in accord with current models of emotional reactivity that highlight the role of cognitive variables in the production of anxious and fearful responding to somatic perturbation, and help further clarify the particular predictors of anxiety-related responding to biological challenge. (shrink)

Philosophy of history before the nineteenth century was based on the classical theory of history. That theory, in justifying the purpose of historical studies, maintained that history was a storehouse of good and bad examples; was of particular use in educating statesmen, since it provided them with vicarious experience; and was a more compelling moral guide than the abstractions of philosophy. The unquestioned authority of Polybius and other ancient historians, as well as. of the definitions of history by Pseudo-Dionysius and (...) Cicero , perpetuated the exemplar theory. The rise of professional, academic historical study rendered it irrelevant; Bolingbroke was its last notable exponent. (shrink)

In Oneself as Another, Ricœur famously writes of the ethical intention as “aiming at the ‘good life’ with and for others, in just institutions.” This article explores the potential meaning of “just institutions,” a theme underdeveloped in Ricœur’s work. While many have argued that institutions necessarily reify and so cannot aim toward just ends, the article draws on Ricœur’s differentiation between objectification and reification to show why this need not be the case. While reification destroys human value and meaning because (...) it reduces human activity to a thing, objectification characterizes the positive externalization of ourselves in objects—in words, deeds, structures, and institutions. Institutions such as the law are structures that can positively objectify our just aspirations, even if we must continually guard against these structures’ reified reduction. Ricœur shows us how objectification, including objectification of values in institutions, can be something not only positive but necessary in order for values to flourish. (shrink)

The property producing a field has a qualitative and a quantitative aspect. The former may appear as1, 2, 3,..., n possibilities in the source particles. Interaction lines representing the field must reflect these possibilities. Thus, one expects there to be1, 2, 3,..., n respective kinds of lines joining particles. The different lines interact with each other as well as with the particles at their ends. For gravitational fields,n is1; for electromagnetic fields,n is2; for chromodynamic fieldsn is3. Rest mass can be (...) created by itself out of energy. But a positive-negative pair is the minimum possibility with electric charges, and a color-anticolor pair with quarks. A triplet of quarks or antiquarks, together with the appropriate neutrino, could also arise out of energy. (shrink)

A tachyon or a superluminal wave group appears as a spacelike structure through a region in the reference frame in which it is at rest. Such a structure can arise from residue left (a) by a particle or wave group traveling at fundamental speed c or less, or (b) in the creation or separation of particles. Thus, Maund's argument does not prove that tachyons cannot exist. Creation may include lepton-quark production as well as particle-antiparticle production.

In the approximation that every inertial observer experiences a homogeneous, uniform flow of time and sees a space that is Euclidean, the arena of physics is Minkowskian and one speed is the same in all intertial frames. If a given intertial observer finds an infinitesimal source or particle traveling faster than this fundamental speed near a given event, the source must appear in some inertial frame spread over neighboring positions at a given time as a spacelike structure. If this structure (...) persists over a period of proper time, it can be interpreted as a wave group. If it is conserved, it can be interpreted as a line or tube of force. (shrink)

In assimilating the study of history to the study of natural science, Bacon emphasized the collection of historical facts and the need to induce general propositions from them. He indicated the psychological character of these propositions and claimed that historians were, and philosophers were not, competent to put moral and mental phenomena on a scientific basis. On the formal side, his theory of history was based on Aristotelian faculty psychology-history, the product of the mnemonic faculty, dealt with phenomena true to (...) life. In intent, his theory was designed to reorient the study of moral philosophy away from rationalism toward an empirical or historical foundation and to emphasize involuntary as well as voluntary aspects of behavior. (shrink)

There is a well-worn image and phrase for libertarianism: "atomized individualism." This hobgoblin has spread so thoroughly that even some libertarians think their philosophy unreservedly supports private persons, whatever the situation, whatever their behavior. Smith's Self-Interest and Social Order in Classical Liberalism, corrects this misrepresentation with careful intellectual surveys of Hume, Smith, Hobbes, Butler, Mandeville, and Hutcheson and their respective contributions to political philosophy.

Philosophy of mind has made substantial progress on biologically-rooted approaches to understanding the mind and subjectivity through the enactivist perspective, but research on subjectivity within neuroscience has not kept apace. Indeed, we possess no principled means of relating experiential phenomena to neurophysiological processes. Here, we present the Nested States Model as a framework to guide empirical investigation into the relationship between subjectivity and neurobiology. Building on recent work in phenomenology and philosophy of mind, we develop an account of experiential states (...) as layered, or nested. We argue that this nested structure is also apparent in brain activity. The recognition of this structural homology — that both experiential and brain states can be characterized as systems of nested states — brings our views of subjective mental states into broad alignment with our understanding of general principles and properties of brain activity. This alignment enables a more systematic approach to formulating specific hypotheses and predictions about how the two domains relate to one another. (shrink)